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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

LEAH C. JONES, MARTHA C.
WHITING AND LOUISE c.
BEETON,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

CASE No. 7424
vs.

MARK B. COOK,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF CASE
Plaintiffs and appellants prosecute this appeal from
a judgment made and entered in favor of the defendant
and against the plaintiffs on the 24th day of June, 1949.
(J. R. 29) Notice of appeal was served and filed on
September 16, 1949. ( J. R. 36) Most of the evidence
is documentary. The only substantial conflict in the
evidence is whether or not Mark Cook, the deceased
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father of the parties hereto, prior to his death made
a gift of a Ford automobile to his son l\{ark B. Cook.
The action was brought by the plaintiffs against
the defendant by filing a complaint on l\fay 22, 1948.
By the complaint the plaintiffs claimed to be the owners
and entitled to the possession of one Ford Sedan automobile, Motor No. 6441914 of the value of $1000.00,
which was converted by the defendant to his own use and
benefit to the damage of the plaintiffs in the sum of
$1000.00 for \vhich amount plaintiffs prayed judgment
against the defendant. (J. R. 1)
To the complaint the defendant answered. By his
ans"\\rer he denies the ownership of the automobile by
the plaintiffs. He further alleges that his father died
on July 30, 1943; that on July 1st, 1944 the last will
and test·ament of his father was admitted to probate
and he wa~ appointed executor of the will; that he
qualified as such executor and on August 18, 1948 a
decree of distribution was entered and that he was
finally discharged as executor on September 15, 1945;
that ·an inventory and appraisement of the estate was
filed in which the automobile was not listed; that the
property of the estate was appraised but the automobile
was not listed or appraised for the purpose of fixing
inheritance taxes; that no objection was made by the
widow or children of the dece,ased because the automobile
was not listed; that an account was filed with the court
in which the estate of Mark Cook, deceased, was being
probated; that no objections were made thereto; that
Irene B. Cook, the widow of the deceased gave a RECEIPT
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To ~lark B. Cook "?herein she ackno,vledged thP rereipt
of the property 'Yhich 'Yas distributed to her; that the
plaintiffs kne'"' that ~lark B. Cook clairned the autornobile
and that he had possession thereof~ that neither the
wido". . of the deceased nor the plaintiffs filed objection
to the account or the proceedings had in the course
of the probating of the estate of Mark Cook, that after
the death of Irene B. Cook, and on or about June 21,
1947, the defendant herein filed a suit against the plaintiffs herein and then in that suit for the first tirne
plaintiffs, as executrices of the estate of Irene B. Cook
claimed to be the owners of said automobile. That
notices of the various probate proceedings were given
as by la\Y required. That by reason of the facts alleged
by the defendant herein the plaintiffs are estopped
from claiming the automobile and that any claim that
the plaintiffs may have had in or to the automobile is
res adjudicata.
As a further defense the defendant alleges in his
answer that plaintiffs ·alleged cause of action is barred
under and by virtue of Title 104, Chapter 2, Subdivision 2 of Section 24, Utah Code Annotated, 1943.
N(n,. .here in the answer does the defendant affirmativelv
"'

allege ownership of the automobile in himself by reason
of a gift by his father. So far ·as is disclosed by the
answer defendant claims ownership of the automobile
hy reason of the probate proceedings notwithstanding
the dec-ree of distribution did not order the automobile

distributed to the defendant herein. (J. R. 7 to 14)
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To the answer of the defendant .the plaintiffs filed
a reply in which they admit the . ·allegations of the
defendant touching the p·robate proceedings. They also
admit that Mark B. Cook, the defendant, during the~
time he was acting as executor had possession of the
automobile as by law permitted; that Irene B. Cook
held ,a life estate in said automobile until the date of
her death which occurred on September 14, 1946.
Plaintiffs in their reply denied generally the other
allegations of the answer of Mark B. Cook. (J. R. 15
to 17)
We have at some length directed the attention of
the court to the pleadings because many of the pleaded
facts, particularly those relating to the probate proceedings, are not and may not be contradicted.
The parole evidence is directed prim·arily to the
question of whether or not Mark Cook, during his lifetime made a gift of the property to his son Mark B.
Cook. It probably should be noted at the outset that
the trial court refused to make a finding on that question. However, we deem it necessary to direct the attention of the court to that phase of the case as otherwise the court might conclude that in the absence of
evidence showing or tending to show that the automobile belonged to Mark Cook at the time of his death
the plaintiffs failed to make out a prima facie case.
Before referring to the oral testimony the attention of the court is directed to the terms of the will
of Mark Cook, deceased. The will of Mark Cook and
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his \Yife Irene B. Cook \YH~ read into the record and
"~in be found in the tran~eript at pages 27 to 29 of the
transcript. It 'vill be noted that Irene B. Cook if she
surYiYed her husband, \Yhich she did, \Vas given a life
estate in all the real property belonging to her husband
at the time of her death.
~lark

B. Cook the son, was given, subject to the
life estate of Irene B. Cook, the real property, the
water stock, farm machinery and implements used in
connection with the farm. The plaintiffs were given,
share and share alike, subject to the life estate of the
mother Irene B. Cook all of the rest, residue and remainder of the property of every name and nature.
(Tr. 27 and 28)
By the decree of distribution there was distributed
to Irene B. Cook a life estate in all of the property
owned by her deceased husband, Mark Cook.
There was distributed to Mark B. Cook, defendant
herein, subject to the life estate of Irene B. Cook, the
real estate, water stock, farming machinery and equipment.
Leah C. Jones, M·artha C. Whiting and Louise C.
Beeton were decreed, share and share alike, subject to
the life estate of Irene B. Cook all the rest, residue and
remainder of the estate. What constitutes the resr,
residue and remainder is not listed.
It is also provided in the decree of distribution
that: "any and all other property not n0\\ kno-vvn or
7
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discovered which may belong to said estate or in which
said estate 1nay have any interest be and the same
is hereby distributed in accordance with said last "Till
and testament. (Tr. 31 to 34)
The evidence shows ''Tithout conflict that the automobile at the time of the death of l\1ark Cook and
at all times since his death stood in his name in the
office of the State Tax Commission. (See Plaintiffs'
Exhibit "A") The signature on the certificate of
registration in 1941 is that of Mark Cook, deceased.
(Tr. 6) The other signatures of 1942, 1943, 1944, 1945
and 1946 are the signatures of Mark B. Cook, the defendant herein. (Tr. 80) The evidence also shows
that the defendant in all of the probate proceedings of
his father signed his name as Mark B. Cook. He so
signed his name gener·ally. (Tr. 81)
In addition to the certifieate of registration standing in the name of Mark Cook the evidence shows that
defendant Mark B. Cook was familiar \\rith the procedure in order to transfer title. (Tr. 81) No claim
is made that the certificate of ownership was ever
signed by Mark Cook, the father of the parties herein.
The evidence is to the contrary. (See photostatic copy
of certificate of ownership, defendant's Exhibit 1.)
In addition to the foreg-oing evidence plaintiff Leah
C. Jones testified that her father died on July 30, 1943
·and her mother on September 14, 1946. That during
his lifetime her father had in his possession the 1941
model Ford sedan. (Tr. 5)

That in December, 1943,
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after the death of her father as her mother \Yas about
to go to Arizona ~Iark B. Cook told his mother that
it would be necessary for him, l\Iark B. Cook, to have
the certificate of o'vnership of the Ford automobile
in order to cross the state line into Arizona and that
later the mother, Irene B. Cook, told l\Irs. Jones that
she had giYen the certificate of ovvnership of the Ford
to Mark. (Tr. 108-109)
Mrs. Jones further testified that she had not seen
the decree of distribution until the day of the trial. ( Tr.
110) That she went to the place vvhere and at th~
time when the hearing was had for the purposes of
appraising the prop.erty for inheritance tax purposes.
That she \Yas told that there was no reason for her to
remain and she left. (Tr. 111) That she did see a copy
of the decree approving and allovving the Final Account
of the executor and petition for final distribution of the
estate among her mother's papers after her death.
(Tr. 111) That in February, 1945, she vvrote a letter
to find out in vYhose name the ai1tomobile stood.
Martha C. Whiting testified that she went to the
office of Judge Christenson, vvho represented Mark B.
Cook, as executor of the estate of Mark Cook, and that
she inquired about the automobile and was told by
Judge Christenson that Mark had a right to use the
automobile while he was acting as executor. (Tr. 121)
~Irs.

Whiting further testified that after the death of

her father Mark came to his mother for the keys to
thP car and the mother gave them to him. (Tr. 43)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

The evidence also shows that Irene B. Cook had
the automobile insured in the name of Irene B. Cook
after the death of her husband that she paid the insurance premium. Prior to the death of Mark Cook jn
June, 1943 he insured the automobile in the name of
Mark Cook. (Tr. 37)
Notwithstanding there is no allegation in the answer to the effect that defendant Mark B. Cook paid
the taxes on the automobile he testified that he paid
the taxes for the years 1944, 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948
and 1949. (Tr. 56)
Mrs. Cook, the wife of the defendant, testified that,
at a time not fixed in her direct examination, she and
her husband, Mark B. Cook and her father-in-law Mark
Cook, took a ride up. Provo Canyon and Mr. Cook, the
elder, said: ''Mark, here is the certificate of ownership and extra set of keys to the car. I'm giving it to
you with the understanding that you take Mother and
I at any time we want to go." (Tr. 94) It will be
observed that there is no allegation in defendant's answer to the effect that the automobile was given to hirn
by his father. The evidence further shows that Mark
B. Cook took his mother to Arizona after the death
of his father but refused to permit the car to be used
to take Mrs. Cook to Logan. (T-r. 131)
From the foregoing brief statement of the evidence
it will be seen that such evidence is ample, if not conclusive, to show that the automobile was ·a part of the
estate of Mark Cook at the time of his death.
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,,. . e are mindful that this eourt Ina~· not reYiP"\\. the
conflicting evidence and determine the question of
'vhether or not the anton1obile belonged to thP estate
at the time of the death of ~lark Cook. Ho,YevE)r if the
evidence is conclusive that the autoinobile belonged to
the estate or if it should adopt the vie-vv expressed in
the dissenting opinion in the case of Jackson vs. Ja1nes,
97 Utah 41, 89 Pac. ( 2d) 235, then and in such case the
plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment for $800.00, the
stipulated value of the automobile. ( Trs. 50-51)
In the Findings of Fact the trial court expressly
refused to make a finding as to whether or not Mark
Cook had made a gift to his son Mark B. Cook. (J. R.
page 21) The court based its judgment upon (1) the
fact that in the probate proceedings the plaintiffs made
no objections; and (2) upon the fact that the defendant
had possession of and paid the taxes upon the automobile. (J. R. 20 to 29)
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERR,QR
Come now the plaintiffs in the above entitled action
and assign the following errors upon which they rely
for a reversal of the judgment made and entered on
June 24, 1949 in the above entitled cause.
1. The trial court erred in that part of its finding
of Fact No. 1 wherein it found: ''that defendant has
been in possession of said automobile with the kno"\\Tledge
of the plaintiffs, under claim in good faith made by
the defendant that said automobile has been given to
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the defendant by the said 1\Iark Cook as a gift." That
such finding is without support in the evidence and is
contrary to the preponderance thereof. (J. R. 21)
2. The trial court erred in making that part of its
finding No. 2 wherein it is in effect found that no mention \Yas made in the \Vill of the auto1nobile involved
in this action. That such finding is without support in
the evidence and is contrary to the clear preponderance
thereof. (J. R. 21)
3. The trial court erred in making that part of
finding of fact numbered 10 wherein it found: ''That
during or before the month of February, 1945 and long
prior to the date of said decree the plaintiffs had full
knowledge of the individual claim of the defendant to
the ownership of said automobile, and of the defendant's
possession thereof pursuant to said claim, and that
when said decree was made and entered, the said automobile and the facts with respect to defendant's clairn
thereto were and had been kno\vn and discovered''.
That such finding is without support in the evidence
·and is contrary to the preponderance thereof. (J. R. 25)
4. The trial court erred in making that part of finding numbered_ 11 wherein it found that the defendant
delivered to Irene B. Cook all of the residue of the
property belonging to the estate of said deceased. That
such finding is without support in the evidence and is
contrary to the clear preponderance thereof. (J. R. 25)
5. The trial court erred in making that part of its
finding numbered 14 wherein it found that notwithSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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standing· their kno,vledge thnt the defendant elain1PJ
said autornobile as his ow·,n personal propert~· and h~·
Yirtue of said claim the plaintiff8 herein or either of
them haYe eYer made or filed any objection or prote~t
on account of the failure of n[ark B. Cook, as executor
or other,Yise, to list the said automobile or to report
to the inheritance tax appraisers. That such finding
is vvithout support in the evidence and is contrary to
the clear preponderance thereof. ( J. R. 26)
6. The trial court erred by in effect finding that
the plaintiffs are estopped to claim any right, title or
interest in said automobile involved in this action to-wit:
that certain Ford sedan automobile, Motor No. 6441914,
and that the decree of final distribution is res adjudicata
with respect to said automobile. That such finding i3
without support in the evidence and is contrary to the
clear preponderance thereof. ( J. R. 27)
7. The trial court erred in making its finding riurnbered 16 wherein it found that for more than three
years immediately prior to the commencement of this
action the defendant Mark B. Cook has had and held
in good faith the open, notorious and adverse possession
of said automobile hereinabove referred to, and described and involved in this action, under a claim of
individual right and with the kno,Yledge of the plaintiffs and said possession and claim, and that said

canst~

of action of the plain tiffs herein is barred under and

by· virtue of Title 104, Chapter 2, Subdivision 2 of
Section 24, Utah Code Annotated, 1943. That such
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finding is without support in the evidence and is contrary to the clear preponderance thereof. (J. R. 27)
8. The trial court erred in making its first conclusion
of law wherein it concluded that plaintiffs are estopped
to claim any right, title or interest in sai~ automobile
and that the decree of distribution is res adjudicata as
to the right of the plaintiffs to recover the value of
said automobile. That such conclusion of law is without
support in either the evidence or the findings of fact
and is contrary to law. (J. R. 27)
9. The trial court
of law numbered 2 in
without support in the
of law and is contrary

erred in making its conclusion
that such conclusion of law .is
findings of fact or conclusions
to law. (J. R. 27)

10. The trial court erred in making its conclusion
of law numbered 3 in that such conclusion of law is
without support in the evidence or the findings of fact
and is contrary to law. (J. R. 28)
11. The trial court erred in making its conclusion
of law numbered 4 in that such conclusion of law is
without support in the findings of fact or conclusions
of law and is contrary to law. (J. R. 28)
12. The trial court erred in awarding judgment dismissing plaintiffs' complaint. ( J. R. 29)
13. The trial court erred in a warding costs to the
defendant.
14. The trial court erred in adrrii tting in evidence
over plaintiffs' objection the verification to the invenSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tory and
(Tr. G~)

apprai~enlPnt

filed in the ca8e of l\Iark Coole

15. The trial court erred in failing to find upon the
question of \Yhether or not a gift of the automobile \Va~
made by Mark Cook to his son l\Iark B. Coole (J. R. 21)
16. The trial court erred in failing to find that Mark
Cook did not make a valid gift of the automobile to
Mark B. Cook.

17. The trial court erred in failing to find for
plaintiffs and in failing to avvard plaintiffs judgment
against the defendant for the sum of $800.00.
ARGUMENT
In our view there are three main questions presen ted by this appeal. They are :
First: Does the decree of distribution distribute
the automobile to the plaintiffs herein~
Second: May an executor of an estate acquire title
to either real or personal property of an estate or
deprive the persons entitled to such property of all
rights therein by neglecting to place the same in an
inventory and appraisement and otherwise failing to
account

therefor~

Third: May an executor by paying taxes on

tht~

property of an estate which he is administering acquire
title to such property by adverse

possession~
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IN LEGAL EFFECT THE DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION IN
THIS CASE DISTRIBUTED THE REVERSIO·NARY INTEREST, IF ANY, OF THE ESTATE OF MARK COOK IN AND
TO THE AUTOMOBILE TO THE PLAITIFFS HEREIN.

U.C.A. 1943, 101-3-9 provides:

''In ·a specific devise or legacy the title passes
by the will, but possession can only be obtained
from the personal representative; and he may be
authorized by the court to sell the property devised and bequeathed in the cases herein provided.''
A similar provision is contained in the law of succession.
U.C.A. 1943, 101-4-2.
The will of Mark Cook and his \Vife Irene B. Cook
devised and bequeathed to Irene B. Cook a life estate
in all of the property owned by Mark Cook and to Mark
B. Cook the reversionary interest in the real estate,
farming machinery and "rater stock and to Leah C.
Jones, !fartha C. Whiting and Louise C. Beeton, share
and share alike, all of the rest, residue and remainder
of their estates of every name and nature. (Tr. 29)
The decree of distribution distributed the property
to the persons entitled thereto ''as des.cribed in the
decree, and any and all other p·roperty not now known
or discovered which may belong to said estate or ln
which said estate may have any interest he and the
same is hereby distributed ~ accordance with said last
will and testament." (Tr. 30 and 31)
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It "·ill thus be seen thn t th~ reYersionary interest
in the automobile 'Ya~ bequeathed to the plaintiff and
the decree of distribution is broad enough to include
any and all interest that :Jiark Cook, deceased, had in
the automobile.
In construing a decree of distribution recourse as .
to its Ineaning· may be had to the will and if there_ is
any ambig·nity or any matters are omitted the terms of
the "·ill are incorporated into the decree of distribution.
34 C.J.S. 453 and cases cited in the foot note. The case
of In re: Effersons' Estate, 259 Pac. 919; 70 Utah 258
is among the cases there cited. It is clear that the
automobile ,,·as not distributed to the defendant and if
it 'vas not distributed to the plaintiffs, any interest or
title of :\lark Cook, deceased, remains suspended in
mid air. The trial court did not find that the automobile
belonged to the defendant, and so far as the record
title is shown in the office of the State Tax Commission
the automobile is still owned by Mark Cook, deceased.
The provisions of Article 4, U.~C.A .. 1943, 57-Ba.-62 requires that one '\vho claims to be the owner of a motor
vehicle which he operates upon the public roads of this
state must be the registered owner of such automobite
so opera ted.
From what has been said it follows that if the
plaintiffs have been divested of the right, if any, that
}lark Cook had in the automobile it must be because
they did something or failed to do something resulting
in their becoming divested of such title or interest.
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PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ESTOPPED FROM

BRINGING

THEIR ACTION IN CONVERSIO·N FOR THE VALUE
OF THE AUTOMOBILE.

By assignments numbered 1, 3, 5, 7 the plaintiffs
attack the findings of the trial court to the effect that
the plaintiffs knew that Mark B. Cook claimed to be the
owner of the property before, during and after he
became the ap~pointed and acting executor of his father's
estate. An examination of the evidence will show that
such finding is wholly without support in the evidence.
The evidence is to the contrary. The facts disclosed
by the evidence are these : The certificate of ownership
at all times stood in the name of Mark Cook in the
office of the State Tax Commission "Without there ever
having been any transfer to Mark B. Cook or anyone
else. (Plaintiffs' Exhibits "A" and "B". Tr. 6-7-8)
Up to the time of the death of Mark Cook the automobile
was at all times kept in his garage and was also kept
there part of the time after his death. (Tr. 5-10) In
February, 1945 Mrs. Jones wrote to the Tax Commission
and learned that the automobile had not been transferred from her father's name. (Tr. 13) Mrs. Jones
knew that Mark was driving the car because her mother
could not drive a car. (Tr. 14) Mrs. Jones knew that
her mother claimed a life estate in the car. (Tr. 21)
Hilton A. Robertson testified that he insured the automobile in the name of Irene B. Cook after Mark Cook's
death and in Mark Cook's name before he died. (Tr.
36-39) Mrs. Whiting testified that after her father'~
death Mark came to his mother and secured the keys
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to the automobile. (Tr. 4~) )Irs. 'Vhiting testified
that nlark refused to let hi~ mother take the car to
go to Logan about July :24, 1944. (Tr. 47-48) That the
car "~as in the garage at the home of ~{r. and Mrs.
J\Iark Cook ( 49), but after Mrs. Cook went to Arizona the car 'Yas gradually kept more of the time at
~lark B. Cook's residence.
:Jiark Cook testified that part of the time after he
claimed he had possession of the certificate of ownership it was kept in his father's garage. (Tr. 86) He
further testified that he had never told his sisters that
he had the certificate of title to the automobile. (Tr. 90)
Both Mrs. Jones and Mrs. Whiting testified that
they had no actual knowledge of what was contained
in the inventory and appraisement or the decree of
distribution until after the death of their mother. (Tr.
110 and 122)
The foregoing contains a summary of all the evidence we are able to find in the record touching the
claimed knowledge of the p~laintiffs that Mark B. Cook
claimed to be the owner of the automobile. None of
such evidence lends support to the findings to the effect
that plaintiffs had any knowledge that defendant claimed
to be the owner of the automobile. All of the evidence
is to the contrary. The fact that Mark B. Cook had
possession of the automobile may not be said to advise
or even tend to give notice to the plaintiffs that defendant claimed the automobile. The plaintiffs '""ere
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mobile until the death of their mother which occurred
on September 14, 1946. (Tr. 6) Mark Cook was in no
condition to drive the automobile for some time before
his death (Tr. 9), and Mrs. Cook was unable to drive
an automobile. (Tr. 14) Thus if the plaintiffs are
estopped from claiming the automobile or its value
it must be because they failed to assert their rights in
the probate proceedings. It should be observed that
"rhen the probate p~roceedings were being had it vvas
a matter of sheer speculation as to whether the plaintiffs would ever receive any right of value in the automobile. It may well have been worn out before their
right to its possession vested in them.
~

It has repeatedly been held by the courts of record
1n California that the settlement of an executor's account and the allowance thereof by the court in the
absence of an appeal is conclusive against all persons
interested in the estate but only as to such matters a.~
"\\rere actually included in the account or objections
thereto and actually passed upon by the court. Son tag
vs. Swperior Court, in and for Los Angeles ~County, 36
Pac. (2d) 140; Wallis vs. Walker, 37 Cal. 424; 99 Am.
Dec. 290; Tobelmarn vs. Hildebrandt, 72 Cal. 315, 14 Pac.

20; Estate of Adams, 131 Cal. 415, 63 Pac. 838; Estate
of Ross, 179 Cal. 335; 182 Pac. 303; Estate of :Clary, 203
Cal. 335; 264 Pac. 242; In re: Evans Estate, 144 Pac.
(2d) 625.
We are mindful that under the provisions of U.C.A.
1943, 102-11-37, 'vhich is

taken from the California
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Code, the ~ettle1nent of an account of an executor or
administrator is, in the absenre of fraud, conclusive
as to all matters stated in the account and as to 1natters
'Yhirh have been litigated in the probate proeeeding.
It 'Yas so held In re: Raleigh's Estate, 48 Utah 128; 158
Pac. 705. In the case of fraud such doctrine does not
apply. Weyant vs. Utah Savings and Trust Contpany,
54 Utah 181; 182 Pac. 189.
In the case of In re: Rice's Estate, ______ Utah ______ ;
182 Pac. (2d) 111, there is reviewed a number of Utah
cases dealing \Yith the question of whether or not a
proceeding for the determination of the title to property claimed by the estate and also claimed by some
one else must be tried in the probate matter or by an
ordinary action at law or suit in equity. The conclusion
is reached that it might be triecl as a part of the probate
proceeding or as an independent action and cases holding
that the case may not be tried as a. part of the probate
proceeding are overruled. In the course of the opinion
it is said on page 117 of 182 Pac. (2d) that a decree
of distribution in probate p~roceedings after due and
legal notice, by a court having jurisdiction of subject
matter is conclusive as to the funds, property, items
and matters covered by and properly included within
the decree until set aside or modified by the court entering the decree in the manner prescribed by law or until
reversed on appeal.
In that case the court cites U.C.A. 194.3, 102-11-37
hereinbefore referred to and also U.C.A. 194.3, 102-14-23.
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The latter provision provides that mistakes in settlement
may be corrected at any time before final settlement
and discharge and after that time by an action in equity
on such showing as will justify the interference of
the court.
In this case nothing was said about the automobile
in the probate proceedings. The court certainly did not
distribute the automobile to the defendant. As ·we have
heretofore pointed out any interest which Mark Cook
had in the automobile after the death of Irene B. Cook
was distributed to the plaintiffs.
The language of the decree of distribution wherein
it states that there is distributed to Leah C. Jones,
Martha C. Whiting and Louise C. Beeton, daughters of
said deceased, the reversionary interest in and to all
the rest, residue and remainder of the estate of said
deceased in equal, undivided shares clearly includes
everything belonging to the estate not devised or bequeathed to Mark B. Cook. The automobile is included
within such language just as clearly as the other personal
property which was bequeathed to the plaintiffs.
THE DOCTRINE OF RES ADJUDICATA DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE PLAINTIFFS FROM MAINTAINING THIS
ACTION.

Most of what we have said under the preceding
heading is applicable to the claim that the title to the
automobile has been adjudicated, as we understand
defendant's position, in his favor. There is a total
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absence of any language in the decree of distribution
a'Yarding· the automobile to the defendant. As "'e have
heretofore pointed out the decree of distribution a"rard~1
to the plaintiffs the reYersionary interest of all property of the e~tate not a'Yarded to the defendant.
The authorities are generally to the effect that
"~here the legal title to property stands in the name
of the decedent it is the duty of the executor or administrator to include the same in the inventory and appraisement, especially where the claim is made by the representative. 33 C.J.,S.. 1088, and cases cited in foot note.
That such is the duty of an executor or administrator
in the case of an automobile seems to be essential under
the provisions of our motor vehicle law. U.,C.A. 1943,
Article 4, Sec. 57-32-62.
If the defendant in this case had placed the autoInobile in his inventory and then sought to have the
same distributed to him the other persons interested
in the estate would have had notice of such claim and
been given an opportunity to resist the same. Under
the facts disclosed by the evidence in this case and the
law applicable to said evidence as announced by the
trial court an administrator may acquire title to property by failing to list the same in the inventory and if
the persons entitled to the property fail to discover the
neglect then they are precluded from recovering that
to which they are justly entitled. Such doctrine is at
war vvith well established principles of law. An executor
or administrator occupies a fiduciary relation to the
persons entitled to the proceeds of the estate 'vhich he
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is administering and if he claims any interest adverse
to others interested in the estate it is his duty and
obligation to bring home to them his adverse claim.
In this case there is nothing which shows or tends to
shovv that the defendant claimed the automobile until
after the death of Irene B. Cook.
The recent case of Austin Rice vs .. Erma Rice, Executrix and Trustee in the Ma·tter of the Estate of David
L. Rice, deceased, decided by this court on December
21, 1949, but not yet reported or final, announces
principles of law which are applicable here. In this
case, as in the Rice case, the executor did not ·mention
to the court that Mark Cook left an automobile standing
in his name. Nor did he inform the appellants that he
claimed the automobile. On the contrary he signed his
father's name to the certificate of registration which
'vas calculated to mislead the appellants to believe
that he recognized the ownership of the automobile
to be in his father. Defendant did not seek to have the
automobile distributed to himself. On the contrary he
failed and neglected to inform the court that the legal
title to the automobile stood in the name of his father.
Moreover as we have heretofore pointed out the decree
of distribution distributes to the appellants herein ''the
reversionary interest in and to all of the rest, residue
and remainder of the estate."
The automobile, if it belonged to Mark Cook, having
been distributed to and vested in the appellants. upon
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the death of their mother there "·as no ocea~1on to
have the decree of distribution amended. The derree
vested the o'Ynership of the automobile in appellants
the same as it vested in them the ownership of the other
personal property. That being so and the respondent
having· appropriated the automobile to his own use the
appellants elected to bring this action in conversion.
PLAINTIFFS' RIGHT TO MAINTAIN THIS ACTION IS NOT
BARRED BY THE PLEADED STATUTE OF LIMITATION.

There are three reasons why the provisions of
T,itle 104, Chapter 2, Subdivision 2 of Section 24, Utah
Code Annotated, 1943, are not available as a defense
to this action. They are:
First: An executor or administrator may not acquire title to property vvhich he is administering by
adverse possession. 53 C.J.S. page 954, Sec. 19; 54 C.J.S.
Sec. 6, page 162; 34 C.J.S. Sec. 733, page 756 and cases
cited in foot notes. See also Hatch vs. Hatch, 46 Utah
116, 148 Pac. 1096.
The decree of distribution in this case was signed
and filed on September 5, 1945. (J. R. 24)

Mark B.

Cook was discharged as executor on September 12, 1945.
(J. R. 25)

The complaint in this action was filed on

May 22, 1948, summons was served on the defendant
on May 22, 1948. It will thus be seen that the action
was commenced wrell within three years after the decree
of distribution vvas made and filed:
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Second: Moreover the plaintiffs were not entitled
to the possession of the automobile until the death of
their mother which occurred on September 14, 194·6.
( Tr. 5) These appellants could not be heard to complain
if Irene B. Cook, who held. a life estate in the automobile
saw fit to permit her son Mark to use the automobile.
Nor were the plaintiffs required to make inquiry as to
who was paying the taxes. While Mark B. Cook was
acting as executor it was his duty to pay the taxes and
after his discharge it was the duty of Mrs. Cook to
pay the taxes. If she was content to let Mark pay
the taxes for such use as he made of the automobile
it was no concern of these appellants. They were without the right to maintain the action until they were
entitled to the possession of the automobile and probably not until they made demand for the possession of
the automobile. 46 Am. Jur., page 33, Sec. 55. Also
53 Am. Jur., page 945, Sec. 181.
Demand for possession was not made by the plaintiffs until on or about May 12, 1948. (Defendant's Exhibit 4)
Third : One who conceals property or the ownership thereof may not he heard to plead the bar of the
statute of limitations during such time as he conceals
such ownership, or one who conceals the existence of a
cause of action may not be heard to plead the bar of
the statute of limitations during the time of such concealment, especially where there is a fiduciary relation.
54 C.J.S . 221; Peteler vs. Robison, 81 Utah 535; 17 Pac.
(2d) 244.
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THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND ON ALL
ISSUES RAISED BY THE PLEADINGS AND IN FAILING
TO FIND THAT THE PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED TO
A JUDGMENT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT FOR THE
SUM OF EIGHT HUNDRED DOLLARS.

As we have heretofore in this brief pointed out the
trial court failed and refused to find on the question
of whether or not the claimed gift was ever made by
Mark Cook to his son Mark B. Cook. We have assigned
such failure as error in assignments 15, 16 and 17.
It has been repeatedly held by this court that it
is error for the trial court to fail to find on all material
issues. Among the numerous cases so holding are :
Everett vs. Jones, 32 Utah 489; 91 Pac. 360; Prows vs.
Hawley, 72 Utah 444; 271 Pac. 31; Belnap vs. Fox, 69
Utah 15; 251 Pac. 1073; Hatch vs. Baker, 70 Utah 1;
257 Pac. 673.
If a finding is not rna terial or if the evidence is
such that a finding, if made, must be against the p~arty
complaining then and in such case the error is not
prejudicial and the failure to find on all issues will
not result in a reversal of the judgment.
VVe have heretofore set out the evidence touching
the claimed gift and also the evidence in conflict therewith. We shall not repeat all of such evidence, except
to observe that the same is not sufficient to support a
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finding that Mark Cook made a valid gift of the autoroo bile. In order to be effectual a gift must be fully
·executed, for the reason that there being no consideration therefore no action will lie to enforce it. Wood vs.
Wood, 87 Utah 394; 49 Pac. (2d) 416; Helper State
Bank vs. ;Creer, 95 Utah 320; 81 Pac. (2d) 359; Holman
vs. Deseret Savings Bank, 41 Utah 340; 124 Pac. 765;
Christensen V'S. Ogden State Bank, 75 Utah 478; 286
Pac. 638. See also 38 C.J.S. page 793, S-ec.- 16.
It is said in the Holman case that to constitute a
gift inter vivos the donor must be divested of, and the
donee invested with the right of property in the subject
matter of the gift. It must be absolute, irrevocable,
without any reference to its taking place at some future
period. The donor must deliver the property and part
with all present and future dominion over it.
In this case the defendant must prevail, if at all,
on the oral testimony of Mrs. Mark Cook wherein she
testified that Mark Cook said to his son: "Mark, here is
the certificate of ownership and extra set of keys to
the car. I'm giving it to you with the understanding
that you take Mother and I at any time we want to go."
(Tr. 94) That Mr. Cook then handed to Mark the
extra set of keys and the certificate of o·wnership. It
will be observed that the gift was conditioned upon
Mark taking the father and mother for a ride \Yhenever
they wanted to go.
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There is nothing- in the evidence that 1Iark B. Cook
accepted the gift. The authorities teach that there
must be: ''An unmistakable and unconditional acceptance on the part of the donee to the validity of a gift
inter vivos. It is immaterial whether delivery and acceptance are contemp-oraneous or 'vhich precedes the
other, acceptance need not be immediate, it is sufficient
if the gift is accepted before revocation by death or
otherwise. 38 C.J., page 807-808, Sec.. 29.
'

On cross examination Mrs. Mark B. Cook gave the
following answer to the following question : '' Q. All
right, as I recall your testimony, it was this: That he
stated to Mark that he would give him the car if he
would take the father and the mother out for a ride
when they wanted to go~ A. Not if, with the understanding that we would take them, or Mark would take
them "\Yhen they wanted to go. (Tr. 99)"
There is no evidence that Mark B. Cook accepted
the gift before the death of his father. There is evidence that he repudiated the conditions accompanying
the gift when he refused to take his mother to Logan
or to permit the use of the automobile for such purpose. (Tr. 97) (Tr. 131) Thus according to defendant's
own evidence Mark B. Cook was not given the absolute
possession of the automobile. Such possession as he
had was at all times subject to the right of the father
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and mother to the use of the car when they desired
to go for a ride. So also is there an absence of any evidence that Mark B. Cook accepted the claimeed gift
but on the contrary the evidence shows tha.t Mark B.
Cook refused to comply with the conditions imposed
as a condition of the gift, not to mention the other
evidence showing that a gift was not made.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE
THE VERIFICATIO·N TO THE INVENTORY AND APPRAISEMENT FILED IN THE ESTATE OF MARK COOK.

The apparent purpose of admitting in evidence the
verification to the inventory and appraisement in the
Mark Cook estate was to get before the court evidenee
that Mark Cook gave the automobile to Mark B. Cook.
Such evidence not only is a conclusion but offends
against the provisions of U.'C.A. 1943, 104-49-2.. That
Mark B. Cook is incompetent to testify as to transactions
had between him and his father is clearly provided by
subsection 3 o'f the above cited provision of our statute
would seem clear. That being so he may not indirectly
testify that the property listed in the inventory and
app-raisement is all the property belonging to the estate. To permit such testimony is in effect permitting
him to testify that the automobile was not a part of the
estate because the same was given to him.
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7
''

e 1nention this matter at this tilne because if and
when a new trial is had the trial court may repeat
the error.
It is sub1nitted that the judgment appealed froin
be reversed and that the trial court be directed to enter
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendant for the sum of $800.00, the stipulated value
of the automobile, or if that is not done that a new
trial be ordered and that plaintiffs be awarded their
costs herein.
Respectfully suhmitted,

ELIAS HANSEN,
Attorney for Plaintiffs
and A'(fJvpellants.
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